Linking Language and Events: Spatiotemporal Cues Drive Children’s Expectations About the Meanings of Novel Transitive Verbs by Kline, Melissa Elizabeth et al.
Linking Language and Events:
Spatiotemporal Cues Drive
Children’s Expectations About the
Meanings of Novel Transitive Verbs
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Kline, Melissa, Jesse Snedeker, and Laura Schulz. 2016. “Linking
Language and Events: Spatiotemporal Cues Drive Children’s
Expectations About the Meanings of Novel Transitive Verbs.”




Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions




























































































































































It thus seems clear that children use some kind of structured representation of events 
(rather than purely holistic ‘snapshots’) to put an event perspective into words. How do children 
represent event structures at right level for doing this? Are those representations shared with 
other cognitive processes, or are they part of a language-specific semantic system? Many 
theories of argument structure implicitly or explicitly try to define what might be necessary for a 
meaning-representation system to be able to produce the patterns of syntax that we see. One such 
possibility is found in Dowty’s (1991) theory of Agent and Patient proto-roles, which proposes 
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that the syntactic position of arguments (as subject and object) is determined by a set of features 
or criteria that define prototypical roles. Prototypical agents are sentient, they are volitionally 
involved in the event, and they are causers. Prototypical patients undergo changes of states, are 
affected by the event, and tend to be stationary or inanimate. The argument with the most agent-
like features will become the subject of the sentence, even if both arguments have some features 
from both categories.  Although this is a theory about event participants, it implicitly defines a 
theory of what event representations are like: they are an asymmetrical relation between two (or 
more) elements, roughly of the form [Proto-Agent ACTS-ON Proto-Patient]. This approach can 
explain many patterns of argument realization in language, but it leaves some intriguing 
questions open. In particular, it misses an important level of organization: it is probably not an 
accident that ideal proto-Agents are both sentient and volitional, or that the “causer” feature of 
proto-Agents is mirrored by the “caus-ee” feature of proto-Patients (see Levin & Rappaport-
Hovav, 2005 for discussion). 
Another class of approaches focuses not on the agent-hood of participants, but on the 
decomposition of verb meanings into structured representations. These representations are 
intended to factor apart what is shared across verbs from what is not - their idiosyncratic root 
meanings (like the difference between heating and cooling).  In these theories, causal verbs are 
semantically represented with an internal structure that references the dimensions of meaning 
that matter for syntax (e.g. like  [X CAUSE [BECOME [Y open]]] cf. Jackendoff, 1983; Van 
Valin & La Polla 1997; Croft 2012; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav 2005). These theories make some 
aspects of why event properties are related in syntactic realization explicit: many transitive verbs 
have both a “causer” and “caus-ee” because there is an associated event structure with two 
distinct positions (X,Y) corresponding to these roles, containing a predicate CAUSE that refers 
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to a representation of what causal events are like. These structures also implicitly explain other 
generalizations about verb and sentence meaning: if (as is the case) humans make good causers, 
than many agents of causal sentences will also be human (as is the case).  Of course, we are left 
with a similar question as before: why do we have structures like [X CAUSE [BECOME 
[Y<state>]]] and [Z BECOME-AT W<location>] instead of some other set, and why is it that 
both X and Z (rather than Y and W) are reliably the subjects of sentences?  
Both of these event-perspective representation options leave us with the problem of 
explaining why the system is set up the way it is. It is possible that semantic mapping patterns 
occur for language-specific reasons related to the underlying nature of syntax. For instance, 
Levin and Rappaport Hovav suggest that the correlation between telicity and syntax is a side 
effect of the hierarchical nature of semantic structures (2005, chapter 4.2) Arguments that 
measure out events are typically arguments of an embedded sub-event (in their framework), 
consequentially they generally surface as direct objects or prepositional phrases (build a house, 
walk to the store).  However, when the embedded event does not define the end point (roll the 
ball), the affected entity still surfaces as the direct object because the broad general mapping 
principles make no references to telicity per se.    
Another possibility is that the nature of syntax-to-meaning mappings is related to how we 
non-linguistically represent events. This might happen alongside language-specific phenomena. 
In Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s account, they argue that the connection between transitivity and 
cause (unlike the connection to telicity) is a principled one because each sub-event in a semantic 
structure must introduce a new argument, and causal events necessarily have two sub-events.  If 
structural patterns in language arise from mappings like these, we need to understand how these 
structures are created: how do our general cognitive capacities for understanding events (in terms 
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of cause and other dimensions) get connected in just the right way to an abstract representational 
system leading to external human language? 
Understanding these nonlinguistic representations may be key to fully explaining why 
human language is the way it is. In the case of transitivity, it is not surprising that animacy of the 
subject, physical contact, causal relationships, and goals are all features of many transitive verbs, 
because these three properties are closely related in early cognition (and subsequently in our 
adult common-sense expectations about how the world works). Even babies expect that causing 
changes usually requires contact, and that people have a special status both as causers and 
‘havers of goals’ (c.f. Muentener & Carey, 2010; Saxe, Tenenbaum & Carey, 2005; Woodward, 
1998).  Yet the exact details of these early representations are still debated; it is not clear which 
if any of these ways of seeing events are primary for babies learning to understand and organize 
the world around them.  
Over the past two decades, there has been an increasing appreciation for the role that 
richly structured models of the world play in the cognitive processes of both adults and children 
(cf. Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997). Rather than representing important categories with prototypical 
examples or critical features, cognitive representations are embedded in a system of 
meaningfully related concepts that can support flexible kinds of inference– for instance people 
may have a theory of physics which incorporates ideas about weight, motion, causality and 
allows them to make arbitrary new predictions such as whether a particular block tower will fall 
over (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum 2013). Perhaps children use these same kinds of 
cognitive models to determine which types of relationships can be expressed by a particular 
linguistic structure (see Hartshorne, Pogue & Snedeker 2015 for related ideas). In this view, the 
distinct-but-related roles of causality, telicity, and other features of meaning associated with 
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transitive syntax may result from the flexibility and richness of the underlying cognitive models: 
just as they can support new on-the-fly predictions, these cognitive models could support the 
learning of multiple subtle, related, and yet very abstract generalizations that are reflected in the 
grammatical structure of human languages.  
4.3 Developmental trajectory 
Returning to the specific dimension of meaning addressed in these studies, our findings 
also raise the question of how mappings between cause and transitivity (whatever 
representational form they take) emerge during development. We see three possible accounts of 
how the observed mapping that is established by the preschool years could develop. First, as 
proposed by Fisher and colleagues (Yuan, Fisher & Snedeker, 2012), younger toddlers may 
begin with a global bias to match the number of linguistic arguments to the number of event 
participants, leading to the broad ‘two participant’ preference for transitive verbs discussed in the 
introduction. As they learn their native language and as their nonlinguistic cognition develops, 
additional more specific biases for event construals (e.g. expectations about cause, contact, or 
telicity) might arise if and when they are supported by evidence from the particular language the 
child is learning. At a minimum we know that there must be some change in this mapping over 
time, because languages differ in the range of events described by transitive syntax (Haspelmath, 
1993; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav 2005). 
Alternately, like preschoolers, infants might have additional biases about the links 
between events and the basic structures of language. These biases could result from language-
specific expectations, from more general expectations about communication and social 
interaction (e.g. Tomasello, 1992), or from an expectation that language will mirror nonlinguistic 
cognitive representations (e.g. Pinker, 1989). To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing 
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work that clearly demonstrates that the specific cause-transitivity bias we show exists in younger 
children. While prior work suggests that children as young as 19-21 months prefer to map 
transitive verbs to prototypical causative scenes over other scene categories (Arunachalam et al., 
2013; Yuan et al., 2012), the scene contrasts used in these studies vary along multiple 
dimensions leaving the conceptual basis of the preference unclear. There are, however, good 
reasons for supposing that a causal-transitive bias might be present early in life. As we noted 
earlier, while causal knowledge develops throughout life, some of the guiding principles of 
causal reasoning are in place by 6 months of age (Leslie & Keeble, 1987). Furthermore, the 
cause/transitive mapping is cross-linguistically robust, raising the possibility that it has origins in 
conceptual and learning biases that young children bring to the problem of language acquisition 
(though see Christiansen & Chater (2009) for other explanations of cross-linguistic patterns). 
This hypothesis would be particularly compatible with theories where causation plays a central 
role in argument structure (e.g. Croft, 2012).  
Complicating this question is the fact that children are not born with fully adult-like 
causal knowledge. While spatiotemporal cues to causation affect infants’ attention from the first 
year of life, children initially have very different expectations than adults about the causal 
powers of animate and inanimate entities (Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Muentener & Carey, 2010). 
Any theory involving early connections between argument structure and causation will have to 
account for how children associate linguistic representations with cognitive representations that 
are themselves still developing (e.g. ‘agent’, ‘causation’, etc.). Understanding the development 
of early syntax-to-meaning representations therefore will necessarily involve progress on many 
fronts: we will need to understand the development of these nonlinguistic representations, the 
development of the syntactic representations that express them, and the nature of the mappings 
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that relate them. The methods presented in this study provide an important avenue for beginning 
to answer these questions. 
4.4 Conclusion 
These experiments are the first novel-verb comprehension studies to examine the 
mappings between children’s argument structure knowledge and their nonlinguistic causal 
models of the world. We show that children use syntactic information to guide inferences about 
transitive verb meaning that are closely related to their nonlinguistic concepts of causation. This 
finding shows the importance of exploration into the relationship between children’s linguistic 
and nonlinguistic knowledge. If we can clarify how children’s inferences about word and 
sentence meaning make contact with their nonlinguistic representations, then we will be better 
equipped to understand how children learn about the world from second-hand testimony, 
updating their beliefs about world from the sentences they hear (Bonawitz et al., 2010; Harris & 
Koenig, 2006; Harris, 2002; Nazzi & Gopnik, 2001; Schulz et al., 2008).  
Critically, this study shows that any examination of the semantics of early language must 
be considered a question of cognitive development as well as linguistic development. 
Understanding early representations of verb argument structure will require understanding how 
children in the first few years of life are representing the scenes they see. Even as infants, young 
language-learners also have rich, but not necessarily adult-like, representations of what 
constitutes an agent, a cause, or an event (Baker et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2009; Sobel et al., 2004; 
Spelke, 1990; Woodward, 1998). Any detailed understanding of what children encode in their 
early verb meanings must reckon with the kinds of meaning that a young toddler might have 
available to encode in language.  As has been frequently noted before (c.f. Pinker, 1989), it does 
not seem likely to be a coincidence that many of the proposed central primitives in argument 
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structure theories are also available to the young child -- but we do not yet know what makes an 
early cognitive representation a candidate for becoming part of the grammar (on either 
evolutionary or developmental timescales).  
Exploration into children’s early linguistic representations is a critical part of the effort to 
understand how humans of all ages represent events (Baldwin et al., 2001; Baldwin, Andersson, 
Saffran, & Meyer, 2008; Wolff, 2008; Zacks, 2010). By bringing together the linguistic tests for 
novel verb comprehension with stimulus manipulations from research on prelinguistic cognition, 
we can make detailed, testable predictions about how children make inferences about language 
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